“My dear friend,

              I thank you for your prompt and friendly information of the result of the election, of which Br. Baker was also good enough to inform me by the same mail. At present, however, I find myself more engaged about the report of the Committee of Foreign relations, than anything else, and therefore you must pardon me for speaking once more of it. The letters which you have already received unfold pretty fully my views, which I am sorry to find differ essentially from those of yourself & my friend W. Smith. I assent unequivocally to all you say as to the falsehood, partiality, and unmanly language of the Committee, as to the pother made by them about defence, as to the inefficiency of the means proposed, and most of the other remarks made by you upon that blustering feeble production. But I cannot agree with you in your conclusions, because it appears to me they involved what Chase used to be so fond of talking of, a non sequitur. “You have used indecorous language – there fore we will not aid you in defending the country.”

       “The country is now wholly without the means of defence therefore we call upon you to declare war.”

       “You have a just cause of war against France; therefore make an immediate declaration against England.”

       “Your means of defence as you propose them are not ample enough – we admit most of them may be useful but they should have gone further; therefore we will vote for none of them.”

        My dear friend I cannot do wrong because the democrats are sinners, and in my endeavours to fulfill the wishes of a party, I cannot forget the interests of my Country. What is the situation that we are in? About the unhappy causes of it you and I can never differ, but what is the situation of the country? The Government unhappily stand pledged to France. They will not break faith (as they would term it) with her. England perseveres in her orders in council, and, as you see from the late negotiations, will not revoke them, even upon an undeniable repeal of the French decrees, with out obtaining certain other prerequisites, which it is generally certain never can be obtained from France.  In this state of things what are we the Federalists to do? Shall we invite the government to yield on these points to England, and embroil themselves with France? Would they be willing to do this, or would the public sentiment at all accompany us in such a request? Is it our policy to continue the felo de se practice of holding ourselves up by intemperate language as British partisans, and increasing against a popular prepossession, thereby diminishing our numbers, and our little remaining influence? Will we act with the temperate wisdom of discreet politicians, to urge in direct terms war (preferable as we may alternately believe it to be to a long continuation of the present system) at this time? Could we, if disposed to do so, conceal the real object of such a proposition from our political opponents? Could we (certainly we could not) carry with us the opinions of our own party? Can we object to a gradual augmentation of the means of preparation, consistently with our professions in a state of things having even a tendency to war? What shall we say after having voted against army, navy, militia, volunteers, arming of merchantmen & in favor of a renewal of the nonimportation restrictions?

       But my friend inefficient as you and I consider the proposed increases, our federalists from the eastward are many of them of a different opinion – Some of them think they go to far, and will not vote for them or their full extent, as for instance the 10,000 addl troops, increase of navy &c on that ground.

          As at present advised, I cannot but concur in the opinion of my friend Quincy & others, that political consistency, sound party policy, genuine patriotism, and a fair calculation of consequences, all require my vote in favour of the resolutions of this course the democrats are very apprehensive – they anxiously wish us to oppose them, knowing they can carry them or anything else in despite of our speeches or votes. Some of them are disposed to carry them further than the Com^ee, so as to drive us by that means into opposition. They dread our doing anything that will have a tendency to remove from us the imputation of being tories & British partisans, you will see no speech from me on this subject, our friends inclining to think a silent vote altogether on our side of the house preferable. I am not of that opinion, but unless something occurs to change our views, will acquiesce.

       And now having sufficiently fatigued you with this subject I have only to say that our friends Hopkinson’s ideas coincide on this subject much was nearly with my own than yours do, and I … [here the letter ends]